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ABSTRACT: A formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of scientific 
realism and antirealism are useful or useless. By contrast, an epistemological debate is a 
debate over whether we have sufficient evidence for scientific realism and antirealism defined 
in a certain manner. I argue that Hilary Putnam’s definitions of scientific realism and 
antirealism are more useful than Bas van Fraassen’s definitions of scientific realism and 
constructive empiricism because Putnam’s definitions can generate both formulational and 
epistemological debates, whereas van Fraassen’s can generate only formulational debates. 
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1. Introduction 
There are diverse definitions of scientific realism and antirealism in the literature. This paper 
argues that Hilary Putnam’s (1975: 73) definitions of scientific realism and antirealism are 
more useful than Bas van Fraassen’s (1980: 8–12) definitions of scientific realism and 
constructive empiricism. Why is it important to adjudicate between Putnam’s and van 
Fraassen’s definitions? Realists and antirealists would engage in different debates, depending 
on which definitions they choose as the framework for their debates. Moreover, the 
adjudication would yield useful information about how to define scientific realism and 
antirealism in order to generate voluminous debates about science.  
In Section 2, I specify the distinction between formulational and epistemological 
debates, and then show that Putnam’s definitions can generate both formulational and 
epistemological debates. In Section 3, I argue that van Fraassen’s definitions can generate 
formulational, but not any epistemological debate. In Section 4, I point out that the definition 
of ‘our best theories’ can be found in Putnam’s definitions, but not in van Fraassen’s. Thus, 
indispensablists in the philosophy of mathematics can utilize Putnam’s definitions, but not van 
Fraassen’s. In Section 5, I reply to reviewers’ objections and other objections. This paper is 
intended to be useful to those who wonder what kinds of debates there are in the literature 
with respect to realism, and how we should formulate realism and antirealism. 
 
2. Formulational and Epistemological Debates 
This section distinguishes between formulational and epistemological debates, and shows 
that the no-miracles argument (Putnam, 1975: 73) has generated both types of debates. 
A formulational debate is a debate over whether certain definitions of realism and 
antirealism are useful or useless, or whether certain definitions of realism and antirealism are 
more useful than others. The participants in a formulational debate construct arguments to 
show that certain definitions are useful, or that they are more useful than others. Presenting 
such arguments does not require any commitment either to realism or antirealism. The 
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participants can argue for their definitions without taking an epistemic attitude toward any 
scientific theory, such as the Big Bang theory.  
An epistemological debate is a debate over whether we have sufficient evidence for 
realism and antirealism defined in a certain manner. The participants in an epistemological 
debate construct arguments, such as the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction 
(Stanford, 2006: 20; Wray, 2007, 2010: 371, 2013: 4327; Khalifa, 2010; Nickles, 2017: 153), to 
show that we have enough evidence to believe or disbelieve that certain theories are true, 
empirically adequate, etc. The participants in this debate commit either to realism or to 
antirealism. 
The no-miracles argument (Putnam, 1975: 73) says that it is reasonable to suggest that 
some theories are successful because they are true,1 whereas it is unreasonable to suggest 
that they are successful because a miracle has occurred. A theory is successful, “so long as it 
has worked well, i.e., so long as it has functioned in a variety of explanatory contexts, has led 
to confirmed predictions and has been of broad explanatory scope” (Laudan, 1981: 23). 
According to the no-miracles argument, therefore, realism is the position that affirms, 
whereas antirealism is the position that denies, that we are warranted in believing that 
successful theories are true (Park, 2019a: 280).  
Under Putnam’s definitions, realists and antirealists have engaged in epistemological 
debates over whether or not we are warranted in believing that successful theories are true. 
Realists run the no-miracles argument to establish that we are warranted in believing that 
successful theories are true. In response, antirealists run the pessimistic induction, which 
holds that we can infer the downfall of successful present theories from that of successful 
past theories. The pessimistic induction implies that we are not warranted in believing that 
successful theories are true. It follows that Putnam’s definitions have promoted 
epistemological debates. 
Under Putnam’s definitions, realists and antirealists have also engaged in formulational 
debates. For example, Alan Musgrave (1985: 211) and Jarrett Leplin (1997) have advanced an 
enhanced variant of realism to get around the pessimistic induction. This variant asserts that 
scientific theories making novel predictions are true. Timothy Lyons (2003: 898–899, 2017: 
3204) and Peter Vickers (2017: 3227) retort that some past theories, such as Bohr’s theory of 
the atom and Fresnel’s wave theory of light, made true novel predictions. It follows that 
Putnam’s definitions have also promoted formulational debates. 
Van Fraassen attempts to undercut Putnam’s explanation of the success of science by 
proposing an evolutionary alternative, which holds that the success of science can be 
explained in terms of the survival of successful scientific theories: 
 
… I claim that the success of current scientific theories is no miracle. It is not even 
surprising to the scientific (Darwinist) mind. For any scientific theory is born into a life 
of fierce competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only the successful theories 
survive — the ones which in fact latched on to actual regularities in nature. (van 
Fraassen 1980: 40) 
 
This evolutionary explanation is an alternative to Putnam’s in that it invokes the survival of 
successful scientific theories instead of their truth. The alternative creates the burden for 
 
1 I drop the qualifiers, ‘typically’ and ‘approximately,’ for the sake of convenience. 
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Putnam to prove that his is better than van Fraassen’s. It must be noted, however, that when 
van Fraassen advances the alternative, he operates under Putnam’s definitions, and not his 
own, to which I turn now. 
 
3. Van Fraassen’s Definitions 
Van Fraassen’s definition of realism consists of the aim part and the acceptance part. The aim 
part holds that “Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world 
is like” (1980: 8). The acceptance part holds that “acceptance of a scientific theory involves the 
belief that it is true” (1980: 8). His definition of empiricism also consists of the aim part and 
the acceptance part. The aim part holds that “Science aims to give us theories which are 
empirically adequate” (1980: 12). The acceptance part holds that “acceptance of a theory 
involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate” (1980: 12). In the following subsections, 
I argue that both the aim and acceptance parts of his definitions can generate formulational 
debates, but not any epistemological debate. 
 
3.1. The Aim Parts 
The aim parts of van Fraassen’s definitions cannot generate any epistemological debate. 
Neither says anything about whether we are warranted in believing that, say, the Big Bang 
theory or string theory is true and empirically adequate. It is one thing to say that science 
aims to produce true and empirically adequate theories; it is entirely another to say that we 
are warranted in believing that particular theories are true and empirically adequate. In other 
words, even if science aims to produce true and empirically adequate theories, we might not 
be warranted in believing that particular theories are true and empirically adequate. 
The aim parts, however, can generate formulational debates. After all, van Fraassen’s 
opponents can object that it is problematic to define realism and empiricism in terms of aims 
of science, while offering the following arguments.  
The idea that science has aims clashes with Thomas Kuhn’s (1962/1970: 172) view of 
science. Kuhn argues that science develops through alternations of normal science and 
revolutionary science. Even if these cycles continue, science does not converge on truths. 
Science does not develop toward a goal any more than organisms evolve toward a given end. 
Organisms are “products of a process that moved steadily from primitive beginnings but 
toward no goal” (Kuhn, 1962/1970: 172). The analogy between organisms and scientific 
theories is “very nearly perfect” (Kuhn, 1962/1970: 172). Therefore, it is wrong to say, Kuhn 
would conclude, that science aims to give us true and empirically adequate theories. 
Ironically, van Fraassen also appeals to evolutionary theory to give an account of 
science. Recall that he advances an evolutionary explanation to refute the no-miracles 
argument. The evolutionary explanation, however, does not fit well with his definitions of 
realism and empiricism. On the one hand, the evolutionary explanation embodies the 
Darwinian idea that successful scientific theories exist because they defeated others in a 
battle to survive. On the other hand, van Fraassen’s definitions embody the Lamarckian idea 
that science has aims. It is not clear how van Fraassen can reconcile his Darwinian explanation 
with his definitions. 
Moreover, van Fraassen says that empiricism is better than realism because “it makes 
better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does and does so without 
inflationary metaphysics” (1980: 73). His idea is that both realism and empiricism explain 
science, but empiricism takes less epistemic risk. This difference amounts to “a positive 
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argument for constructive empiricism” (van Fraassen, 1980: 73). 
Something is wrong, however, with this positive argument for empiricism. Realism and 
empiricism assert that science has aims, thus the explanations that they generate are not 
mechanical but rather teleological. In a mechanical explanation, an event is explained in terms 
of its efficient cause. In a teleological explanation, by contrast, an event is explained in terms 
of its final cause, viz., its goal or aim. For example, the mechanical explanation of a rock falling 
is that the Earth exerts a gravitational force on it, while the teleological explanation of it is that 
it has the goal of returning to its natural place. Ancient science regarded both mechanical and 
teleological explanations as legitimate, whereas modern science only regards mechanical 
explanations as legitimate. To explain science in terms of realism and empiricism is to give 
teleological explanations of science, which would be agreeable to ancient scientists, such as 
Aristotle and Ptolemy, but disagreeable to modern scientists, such as Copernicus, Kepler, 
Galileo, Newton, and Darwin. Modern scientists banished aims and goals not only from 
physics but also from biology (Park, 2019b: Section 6). 
Should van Fraassen follow modern scientists on this count? Many philosophers, 
including van Fraassen, embrace naturalism, which holds that philosophy does not 
fundamentally differ from science. Van Fraassen contends, for example, that inference to the 
best explanation is used “in science and philosophy no less than in ordinary life and in 
literature” (1989: 131). As Park (2019c: Subsection 3.1) points out, van Fraassen (1980) uses 
inference to the best explanation to argue for his contextual theory of explanation. To apply 
scientific methodologies to the study of science means prohibiting the explanations of science 
in terms of realism and empiricism, as they are defined by van Fraassen. 
There is a further issue concerning van Fraassen’s contention that empiricism is better 
than realism. Like realism, empiricism invokes an aim of science. It is not clear which is more 
epistemically remote from us, the aim of science or theoretical entities, such as electrons. Van 
Fraassen might argue that the empiricist thesis that science aims for empirically adequate 
theories best explains scientific practices, thus we should believe that science aims for 
empirically adequate theories. Scientific theories, however, also best explain natural 
phenomena. It is not clear why we should believe the empiricist explanation of science, but 
not believe the scientific explanations of the world.  
 
3.2. The Acceptance Parts 
The acceptance part of realism holds that “acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief 
that it is true” (van Fraassen, 1980: 8), and that the acceptance part of empiricism holds that 
“acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate” (van Fraassen, 
1980: 12). To accept a theory is to commit to “confront any future phenomena by means of 
the conceptual resources of this theory” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). One exhibits acceptance of 
a theory by the “assumption of the role of explainer” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). In short, to 
accept a theory is to commit to use it for scientific purposes, e.g., explaining and predicting 
some phenomena.  
The acceptance parts of realism and empiricism are not normative theses. The 
acceptance part of realism does not say that scientists ought to believe, are justified in 
believing, or can rationally believe that a theory they accept is true. Nor does the acceptance 
part of empiricism say that scientists ought to believe, are justified in believing, or can 
rationally believe that a theory they accept is empirically adequate. 
Both parts are descriptive theses. They describe, among other things, what scientists 
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believe when they accept a theory. The acceptance part of realism says that scientists believe 
that a theory they accept is true, whereas the acceptance part of empiricism says that 
scientists believe that a theory they accept is empirically adequate. As noted earlier, to accept 
a theory is to commit to use it for scientific purposes. Thus, the acceptance part of realism 
implies that scientists believe that a theory they use for scientific purposes is true, whereas 
the acceptance part of empiricism implies that scientists believe that a theory they use for 
scientific purposes is empirically adequate. As van Fraassen puts it, acceptance of a theory “is 
a phenomenon of scientific activity” (1980: 12). Thus, the acceptance parts of realism and 
empiricism are different descriptions of science. 
How can we adjudicate between the acceptance parts of realism and empiricism? The 
answer to this question is obvious. Given that they are different descriptions of science, they 
would be true if science is as they say it is. Specifically, if scientists believe that a theory they 
accept is true, then the acceptance part of realism would be true and the acceptance part of 
empiricism would be false. By contrast, if scientists believe that a theory they accept is merely 
empirically adequate, then the acceptance part of realism would be false while the 
acceptance part of empiricism would be true. Thus, the dispute between realists and 
empiricists could be resolved by conducting a thorough psychological survey about what 
scientists believe with respect to the theories that they use for scientific purposes.  
So what? It would be pointless to construct philosophical arguments, such as the no-
miracles argument or the pessimistic induction, to resolve the dispute between realists and 
empiricists. After all, the philosophical arguments say nothing about what scientists actually 
believe. The no-miracles argument does not assert that scientists believe that successful 
theories are true. Nor does the pessimistic induction say that scientists do not believe that 
successful scientific theories are true. Suppose that van Fraassen has refuted the no-miracles 
argument with his evolutionary explanation. The demolition of the no-miracles argument, 
however, would not mean that scientists do not believe that a theory they accept is true. Even 
if the no-miracles argument was refuted, acceptance of a theory might involve the belief that 
it is true. Scientists’ doxastic states are independent of the status of the no-miracles argument.  
Of course, van Fraassen attempts to undermine the no-miracles argument by advancing 
the evolutionary explanation. Recall, however, that in doing so, he operates not under his own 
definitions, but rather under Putnam’s definitions. Under van Fraassen’s definitions, 
empiricists have no reason to refute the no-miracles argument. After all, refuting it would not 
make it more likely that scientists believe that a theory they accept is empirically adequate. 
Refuting the acceptance part of realism requires not refuting the no-miracles argument but 
rather conducting a psychological survey on scientists that would show that scientists do not 
believe that a theory they accept is true. 
Many rival participants in the scientific realism debate, however, do not believe that 
their disputes can be resolved by a psychological study about what scientists believe. They 
rather believe that the resolution will be made through the construction of philosophical 
arguments, such as the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction. They also believe 
that their disagreement concerns not what scientists believe, but rather what epistemic 
attitudes we ought to take toward theories that scientists accept. It follows that the 
acceptance parts of realism and empiricism fail to capture the disagreements among the 
rivaling participants in the scientific realism debate. 
If scientists believe that a theory they accept is true or empirically adequate, that may 
be an interesting fact for philosophers of science to take into account. But neither the fact 
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that scientists believe that it is true, nor the fact that they believe that it is empirically 
adequate, would resolve the dispute among rival philosophers of science. The debate 
between them is not about what scientists believe, but rather about what we are warranted 
in believing. In general, a normative statement cannot be derived from descriptive statements 
(Hume, 1888/1978: 469). 
In this context, it is useful to consider a standard objection to cultural relativism in 
ethics. Cultural relativism asserts that cultural approval makes an action right, and cultural 
disapproval makes an action wrong. Critics object that if cultural relativism were true, we 
could resolve the dispute over the morality of the death penalty simply by conducting an 
opinion poll. If the majority supports the death penalty, it is moral; if the majority opposes it, 
it is immoral. The majority opinion, however, cannot resolve this moral dispute. Neither 
retentionists nor abolitionists would give up their positions in the face of the majority opinion. 
They would only take the majority opinion into account when determining their attitude 
towards the death penalty. Therefore, cultural relativism is problematic (Davis, 2014: 78). 
A similar objection can be raised against van Fraassen’s definitions. Under his 
definitions, the dispute between realists and empiricists could be resolved by conducting an 
opinion poll among scientists. If the majority of scientists say that they believe a theory they 
accept is true, then the acceptance part of realism might be true and the acceptance part of 
empiricism might be false. By contrast, if the majority says that they believe that it is 
empirically adequate, then the acceptance part of empiricism might be true and the 
acceptance part of realism might be false. A majority opinion, however, cannot resolve the 
epistemological dispute over whether we are warranted in believing that a theory that 
scientists accept is true or empirically adequate. No philosopher in the scientific realism 
debate would give up a position in the face of the correct descriptions of what scientists 
believe. 
Empiricists might object that van Fraassen’s definitions do not have the absurd 
consequence that the majority opinion would settle the dispute between realists and 
empiricists. Even if the majority of scientists testified that they believe that a theory they 
accept is true, the dispute between realists and empiricists could persist. Empiricists could 
argue that they do not believe what scientists say about what they believe. They could 
disregard scientists’ testimony and stick to their position that scientists believe that a theory 
they accept is empirically adequate. 
It would, however, be arrogant to contend that philosophers know better about what 
scientists believe than the scientists themselves. It is well-known in philosophy of mind that 
we have better epistemic access to our own mental states than others do. For example, if pain 
occurs in my mind, that mental state is better known to me than to anyone else. Of course, I 
might be wrong about my own mental state. It is still true, however, that I have better 
epistemic access to my mental state than anyone else (Goldman, 1993). Therefore, we should 
put more trust in what scientists say about what they believe than in what empiricists say 
concerning what scientists believe. 
In sum, the acceptance parts of realism and empiricism cannot trigger any 
epistemological debate between realists and empiricists. They can, however, stimulate 
formulational debates among rival philosophers over how useful they are. They can also 
trigger a psychological debate among rival psychologists concerning whether scientists believe 
that a theory they accept is true or empirically adequate.  
Many years have passed since van Fraassen (1980) defined realism and empiricism in 
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terms of acceptance. No philosopher, however, has attempted to adjudicate between the 
acceptance parts of realism and empiricism, i.e., to determine whether “acceptance of a 
scientific theory involves the belief that it is true” (van Fraassen, 1980: 8) or “acceptance of a 
theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). That is 
not surprising, given that philosophers do not conduct opinion polls to resolve psychological 
disputes.  
The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction have dominated the scientific 
realism debate since the 1970s (Magnus and Callender, 2004; Sankey, 2017). Why is it that 
Putnam’s definitions, as opposed to van Fraassen’s definitions, have dominated the scientific 
realism debate for the past several decades? My partial answer to this question is that 
Putnam’s definitions can generate both formulational and epistemological debates, while van 
Fraassen’s definitions can generate only formulational debates.  
 
4. Our Best Theories 
How can we adjudicate between Putnam’s and van Fraassen’s definitions? The more debates 
certain definitions generate about science, the more insights they will generate, and hence 
the more useful they will be. In Sections 2 and 3, I argued that Putnam’s definitions can 
generate both formulational and epistemological debates, whereas van Fraassen’s definitions 
can generate only formulational debates. In this section, I present another reason to think 
that Putnam’s definitions are more useful than van Fraassen’s. 
There are many theories in current science, e.g., the Big Bang theory, evolutionary 
theory, string theory, and so forth. Which of them are our best theories? On what basis can 
we pick our best theories? Is the Big Bang theory one of our best theories? If so, why? What 
about string theory? If not, why not? In short, how can we define ‘our best theories’? 
An answer to this question can be found in Putnam’s definitions, which suggest that our 
best theories are those that are successful. We can pick our best theories by investigating 
whether a particular theory “has functioned in a variety of explanatory contexts, has led to 
confirmed predictions and has been of broad explanatory scope” (Laudan, 1981: 23). The Big 
Bang theory fits this definition of success, while string theory does not.2 Consequently, realists 
would believe that the former is true, but they would not believe that the latter is true. 
By contrast, the answer to the question above cannot be inferred from van Fraassen’s 
definitions. His definitions say that science aims to give us true and empirically adequate 
theories, and that acceptance of a theory involves the beliefs that it is true and empirically 
adequate. Important questions arise. Did science achieve its aim by giving us the Big Bang 
theory or string theory? Are scientists justified in accepting them? Van Fraassen’s definitions 
do not suggest any answers to these questions. That is not surprising, given that his definitions 
do not concern the question of which theories are true or empirically adequate, but rather 
the questions of whether science aims to produce true or empirically adequate theories, and 
whether scientists believe that a theory they use for scientific purposes is true or empirically 
adequate. 
For this reason, van Fraassen’s definitions cannot help indispensabilists in the philosophy 
of mathematics. Indispensablists advocate the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument “that 
mathematics is indispensable to our best scientific theories, observations confirm 
mathematical components as well as concrete components of our best scientific theories, and 
 
2 See Park (2017: 382) for how scientists plan to confirm string theory. 
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hence we ought to believe that mathematical entities are real, just as we ought to believe that 
theoretical entities, such as electrons and black holes, are real” (Park, 2016: 116). This 
argument is advocated by Willard Quine (1948, 1980, 1992), Putnam (1971), Michael Resnik 
(1997), and Mark Colyvan (2001). None of these indispensabilists has defined ‘our best 
theories.’ Without this definition, however, it is not clear which mathematical statements are 
worthy of our beliefs, and which mathematical entities are worthy of our ontological 
commitment. For example, are we justified in believing that the mathematical components of 
the Big Bang theory are true? If so, why? Are we justified in believing that the mathematical 
constituents of string theory are true? If not, why not? Indispensablists cannot find any 
answers to these questions in van Fraassen’s definitions. 
Indispensabilists, however, can find answers to the questions in Putnam’s definitions. We 
are justified in believing that the mathematical components of the Big Bang theory are true, 
but not in believing that those of string theory are true, because the Big Bang theory is 
successful whereas string theory is not. Of course, mathematical antirealists might object that 
we are not warranted in believing that mathematical components of successful present 
theories, including the Big Bang theory, are true, conjuring up the pessimistic induction that 
since successful past theories were discredited, successful present theories, including the Big 
Bang theory, will also be discredited. The mathematical antirealists’ appeal to the pessimistic 
induction, however, would demonstrate that Putnam’s definitions could even trigger 
epistemological debates between mathematical realists and antirealists. Stimulating such 
debates is further proof that Putnam’s definitions are more productive than van Fraassen’s. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
Critics might argue that both the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are 
relevant to van Fraassen’s definitions. The no-miracles argument indicates that true and 
empirically adequate theories are achievable aims of science, and that it is rational to accept 
a theory. By contrast, the pessimistic induction indicates that true and empirically adequate 
theories are unachievable aims of science, and that it is irrational to accept a theory.3  
This critical comment is agreeable. It is, however, compatible with everything I said in 
the previous sections. In Subsection 3.2, for example, I state that the no-miracles argument 
does not assert that scientists believe that a theory they accept is true, so the refutation of 
the no-miracles argument does not mean the refutation of realism. In other words, it is one 
thing that the no-miracles argument is refuted, and it is another that scientists do not believe 
that a theory they accept is true. My claim does not conflict with the reviewer’s reasonable 
comment above. 
My opponents might raise the following objection. This paper claims that Putnam’s 
definitions are better than van Fraassen’s definitions. It does not follow, however, that the 
former are correct, and that the latter are incorrect.4 
Strictly speaking, this paper claims that Putnam’s definitions are more useful than van 
Fraassen’s. It does not claim that the former are correct and the latter are incorrect, or that 
the former are true and the latter are false. Why not? A definition is a proposal about how to 
use a certain term. A proposal can be useful or useless, but it can never be true or false. To 
say that Putnam’s definitions are true and van Fraassen’s definitions are false is as absurd as 
 
3 I thank a reviewer for this critical comment. 
4 I thank a reviewer for this objection. 
9 
 
to say that my marriage proposal is true and your marriage proposal is false. 
Let me elucidate an implication of the definitional nature of scientific realism. Anjan 
Chakravartty observes that “scientific realism is characterized differently by every author who 
discusses it, and this presents a challenge to anyone hoping to learn what it is” (2017). 
Chakravartty’s assertion that different authors characterize scientific realism differently 
should be interpreted not as the claim that different authors describe scientific realism 
differently but rather as the claim that different authors put forward different definitions of 
‘scientific realism.’ Relatedly, it is wrong to ask, ‘What is scientific realism?’ but right to ask, 
‘What definitions of “scientific realism” are there in the literature?’ Which are useful? Which 
are influential? 
Let me turn to another possible objection. On the one hand, this paper criticizes van 
Fraassen’s definitions and defends Putnam’s definitions, thus it clearly engages in a 
formulational debate. On the other hand, it criticizes van Fraassen’s definitions for generating 
only formulational debates. That might appear strange, but it is certainly not self-defeating. 
My position would be self-defeating if it asserted that van Fraassen’s definitions cannot 
generate any formulational debate. My position, however, does assert that they can generate 
formulational debates. Thus, the foregoing criticism is compatible with my position. Let me 
pick up another possible objection, namely that it is wrong to say that van Fraassen’s 
definitions cannot generate epistemological debates. An epistemological debate under van 
Fraassen’s definitions could be over whether or not acceptance of a scientific theory requires 
the belief that it is true, empirically adequate, useful, and so on. In other words, there can be 
a debate over whether those who accept a scientific theory believe that it is true, empirically 
adequate, or useful. Realists, empiricists, and instrumentalists might argue, respectively, that 
accepters believe that it is true, empirically adequate, and useful.  
In light of this objection, I distinguish between epistemological and doxastic debates. 
An epistemological debate concerns whether or not we have sufficient evidence for a doxastic 
state, whereas a doxastic debate concerns whether or not we are in a certain doxastic state. 
Van Fraassen’s definitions can be a starting point for a doxastic debate, but not for an 
epistemological debate. To reiterate, realists and empiricists under van Fraassen’s framework 
are not engaged in a dispute over whether or not we have sufficient evidence for a scientific 
theory. 
Let me now turn to a more general issue. Moti Mizrahi observes that “Whenever the 
work of an influential philosopher is criticized, a common move made by those who seek to 
defend the influential philosopher’s work is to claim that his or her ideas have been 
misconstrued” (Mizrahi, 2018: 19). I have criticized van Fraassen’s definitions in the previous 
sections. So I anticipate that the prospective defenders of van Fraassen’s definitions will 
accuse me of having committed the straw man fallacy. I turn to this objection next. 
The defenders of van Fraassen’s definitions might argue that on close analysis, a 
normative statement can be derived from the aim parts of realism and empiricism. Van 
Fraassen states that an aim “determines what counts as success” (1980: 8). For realists, what 
promotes truths is good, whereas for empiricists, what promotes empirical adequacy is good. 
Hence, realists and empiricists would say, respectively, that scientists ought to perform 
activities that promote truths and empirical adequacy. For example, they ought to make novel 
predictions. Thus, a normative judgement can be derived from the aim parts of realism and 
empiricism, and I misread van Fraassen’s definitions. 
It is one thing, however, to say that science aims for true and empirically adequate 
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theories; it is another to say that scientists ought to pursue them. The inference from the 
former to the latter requires an additional premise, such as the thesis that scientists have a 
motive to achieve the aims of science. Van Fraassen, however, drives a wedge between the 
aims of science and individual scientists’ motives, saying that the aims of science are different 
from individual scientists’ motives, just as the “aim of the game of chess is to checkmate your 
opponent; but the motive for playing may be fame, gold, and glory” (1980: 8). Thus, van 
Fraassen would not say that a normative thesis can be derived from the aim parts of realism 
and empiricism. 
Moreover, I already pre-empted this possible objection in the first paragraph of 
Subsection 3.1 where I argued that it is one thing that science aims to produce true and 
empirically adequate theories; it is another that we are warranted in believing that particular 
theories are true and empirically adequate. Suppose that science has historically aimed for 
empirically adequate theories. Does it follow that scientists were justified in believing that 
their theories, such as Aristotelian mechanics, the caloric theory, and the phlogiston theory, 
were empirically adequate? My answer is no. We now know that past theories could not 
handle empirical anomalies, i.e., that they were empirically inadequate (Park, 2018: 5). Thus, 
past scientists would not have been justified in believing that their theories were empirically 
adequate. It is fallacious to infer that since science aims for empirically adequate theories, 
scientists are warranted in believing that their theories are empirically adequate. Thus, 
claiming that normativity can be derived from the aim parts of realism and empiricism is to 
attribute this fallacious inference to van Fraassen. 
In addition, this possible objection clashes with van Fraassen’s contention that 
empiricism “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does and 
does so without inflationary metaphysics” (1980: 73). Empiricism cannot explain science at 
all, if it consists of the acceptance part and the epistemic thesis that scientists are warranted 
in believing that successful scientific theories are empirically adequate. It is conceptually 
problematic to say, for example, that the Big Bang theory is successful because scientists are 
warranted in believing that it is empirically adequate. In general, it is bizarre to explain 
phenomena in terms of a normative thesis. Thus, to claim that normativity can be derived 
from the aim parts of realism and empiricism is to attribute bizarre explanations to van 
Fraassen. 
Consider also that van Fraassen invokes the English view of rationality when he argues 
that the realist belief that a successful scientific theory is true is “reasonable enough, but 
supererogatory” (2017: 102). The English view of rationality asserts that “what it is rational to 
believe includes anything that one is not rationally compelled to disbelieve” (van Fraassen, 
1989: 171–172). Note that van Fraassen makes a normative claim about the realist belief by 
appealing to the English view of rationality. If normativity already inheres in the aim part of 
realism, as the forgoing possible objection suggests, it is not clear why van Fraassen would 
invoke the English view of rationality to make a normative claim about the realist belief.  
Some readers might still think that I have committed the straw man fallacy against van 
Fraassen. I challenge them to present textual evidence to support their interpretations, 
instead of merely interpreting realism and empiricism according to their own wish, or merely 
expressing their opinions about how realism and empiricism should be interpreted. Also, they 
would have to defuse the textual evidence that I presented in Subsection 3.2, and the 
arguments that I presented in this section for my interpretation of van Fraassen’s definitions. 
Recall that as Mizrahi observes, philosophers commonly defend an influential 
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philosopher’s position by saying that critics misunderstand the influential philosopher’s ideas. 
Mizrahi makes an apt criticism against those philosophers, viz., the continued iterations of 
such a defence make it doubtful that “the influential philosopher’s ideas are worthy of 
attention and/or acceptance” (Mizrahi, 2018: 19). Mizrahi’s criticism is insightful and 
admirable. Continued invocations of the straw man fallacy against the critics of van Fraassen’s 
definitions run the risk of transforming his clear definitions into elusive ones, and hence 
decreasing rather than increasing their philosophical value. 
We can learn nothing from an elusive idea, but we can learn something from a 
problematic one. There is no difference between an elusive idea and an empty one, or at least 
we should treat an elusive idea as if it were empty. As mentioned earlier in Subsection 3.2, 
the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction have dominated the scientific realism 
debate since the 1970s. Another partial explanation of why they have been so influential is 
that they are clear, simple, and elegant. Not surprisingly, they have been roundly criticized in 
the literature. As a result, we have learned a lot about science. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Putnam’s definitions can generate both formulational and epistemological debates, whereas 
van Fraassen’s definitions can only generate formulational debates. This difference partially 
explains why Putnam’s definitions have dominated the scientific realism debate since the 
1970s. One philosophical moral is that if you aim to define realism and antirealism in a way 
that can trigger copious debates, you should do so not in terms of the aims of science and/or 
acceptance of a theory, but rather in terms of a common property of our best theories. The 
resulting debates would yield rich insights about science. 
Finally, I anticipate that many readers will accuse me of having committed the straw 
man fallacy against van Fraassen. Let me remind them that I presented arguments to support 
my interpretation of van Fraassen’s definitions, and that to play the card of the straw man 
fallacy without refuting my arguments and without presenting alternative arguments runs the 
risk of transforming van Fraassen’s clear definitions into elusive ones. Prospective objectors 
are reminded of these two caveats: No elusive idea is instructive, and obscurity is an 
anathema to analytic philosophers.  
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